From today's Espresso - The Economist:
History is never far away on the divided island. Reunification talks sputtered in February after hardline Greek Cypriot parliamentarians passed a law obliging schools to celebrate a 1950 referendum on enosis (unification with Greece), infuriating the Turkish Cypriots. The law was amended, and talks resume today. But the old obstacles to healing the wounds of the 1974 war remain: territory, governance arrangements, and in particular the security guarantees that give Turkey (as well as Greece and Britain) the right to military intervention. So all eyes are on Turkey’s constitutional referendum on Sunday. Optimists argue that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been unable to compromise on Cyprus for fear of alienating the domestic nationalists whose support he needs to win his vote. If so, a deal may be possible afterwards (although both of the island’s communities would have to approve it in referendums). But few would bet on it.
A.
Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
This is from End of January... (a fair overview, and a bit more background than today's espresso story)
Charlemagne
Cyprus can be reunified, if Turkey’s president allows it
After 43 years of division, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are on the verge of a deal
TREAD carefully through the building sites that litter Paphos, testament to the city’s preparations for its stint as 2017 European Capital of Culture, and you eventually find your way to the enclave of Mouttalos. Thousands of Turkish-Cypriots once lived here, before intercommunal fighting, reprisal killings and Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 drove their exodus to the island’s north. George Pachis, a local Greek-Cypriot, sometimes helps those who fled find the graves of relatives. Recalling one brings him close to tears. Accompanying an old widow through the cemetery recently, rather than the single tomb he expected, he found a gravestone listing nine names, including a two-year-old girl. All had been shot dead by Greek- Cypriot irregulars.
The scars of Paphos bear witness to the traumas of Europe’s last divided country. Cyprus’s cleavage may be peaceful today, but it is deeply entrenched. Its artefacts— barbed wire, rusting military outposts—are scrawled artlessly across the UN “buffer zone” that divides Nicosia, the capital. Checkpoints allow easy travel between north and south, but the two peoples lead separate lives; 48% of Greek-Cypriot students have never visited the north, and 43% “rarely” go. Cyprus’s rifts keep the island poorer, hinder the return of refugees, embarrass the European Union (Cyprus joined as a divided island in 2004, but only the Greek-Cypriot republic enjoys international recognition) and act as a regional spoiler, hampering EU- NATO co-operation and the EU’s relationship with Turkey.
The island has been formally split since Turkish troops occupied its northern third in 1974. Reunification schemes have come and gone, most recently in 2004, when the Greek-Cypriot majority rejected a plan devised by Kofi Annan, then UN secretary- general. But more recently Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, respective presidents of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, have brought a settlement within grasp. The two men, who enjoy a strong personal rapport, seek agreement on a “bizonal, bicommunal federation”, with a weak central government overseeing two autonomous communities. Hopes are high, despite the failure of a recent summit in Switzerland. If a deal is reached in the weeks ahead, a new constitution will be drawn up while the leaders drum up support for the double referendum that will follow. But that will take time, and not much is left: Mr Anastasiades faces elections in February 2018 that he may not win.
The outline of a deal has long been clear, and left alone the two men might have found agreement by now. But Cyprus has long been a pawn in the chess games of others. Today, unhappily, the island’s fate lies largely in the hands of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s authoritarian president. Under the provisions of Cyprus’s 1960 independence settlement, Turkey, along with Greece and Britain, maintains a right to military intervention if the island’s constitutional order is threatened. The Greek-Cypriots (and Greece itself) insist on scrapping those guarantees, and on the eventual removal of Turkish troops, several thousand of whom remain in the north. But despite fresh ideas from the UN to allay Turkish-Cypriot fears, such as a multinational police force stationed on the island, Mr Erdogan has so far refused to budge.
The security guarantees are at the heart of the Cyprus problem. Fix them, and you might unlock solutions to other outstanding issues, notably on territory and power-sharing. Only 1% of the island’s land mass remains disputed, and a compromise looks possible: the Turkish-Cypriots relinquish their claim to Morphou, a contested town in the north, in exchange for a rotating presidency, ensuring that Turkish-Cypriots run the federal state for part of the time.
But crossing red lines is hard when you feel the other lot’s guns trained on you. “In Cyprus we don’t fight facts, but ghosts,” says Harry Tzimitras, director of the PRIO Cyprus Centre in Nicosia, a research outfit. Memories of the violence of the 1960s make Turkish-Cypriots loth to give up their protector. Greek-Cypriots balk at the idea of mortgaging their security to Turkey. “It is like asking Latvia to accept a Russian security guarantee,” says Mr Anastasiades. Mr Erdogan’s frequent outrages at home are well noted by the many enemies of a settlement on the Greek-Cypriot side.
Will Mr Erdogan move? No one can be sure. His priority is winning a referendum on constitutional reforms, probably in April; some say he can compromise only after that. Others divine a willingness to help sooner, perhaps to get a piece of the hydrocarbon riches beneath Cypriot waters (and to wean the north off the subsidies it gets from the Turkish treasury). Two planned visits to Ankara by European leaders—Theresa May, Britain’s prime minister, on January 28th, and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, five days later—will sound the president out.
Nervous in Nicosia
Even a deal will leave diffcult referendums to be won. Neither leader will sign an agreement he cannot sell at home. But that job gets harder every year. Younger Greek-Cypriots, raised on a diet of Hellenic nationalism at school and with memories of nothing other than division, are the least likely to support reunification. Nor can support from the Turkish-Cypriots, who backed the Annan plan, be assumed, in part because Mr Akinci’s government is split. Tahsin Ertugruloglu, the Turkish-Cypriot foreign minister, describes the negotiations as a “total failure”.
If that seems unfair, caution is certainly in order. The Cyprus dispute is a repository of dashed hopes and broken dreams. Veteran island-watchers remain almost uniformly sceptical. (The expiry of the Obama administration, which quietly nudged both sides towards a deal, will not help.) It is noble to hope for a resolution to this wretched problem, and the courage of Messrs Anastasiades and Akinci has brought a deal tantalisingly close. But to bet on a reunified Cyprus implies a faith in Mr Erdogan’s statesmanship that the Turkish president has done little to warrant.
Charlemagne
Cyprus can be reunified, if Turkey’s president allows it
After 43 years of division, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are on the verge of a deal
TREAD carefully through the building sites that litter Paphos, testament to the city’s preparations for its stint as 2017 European Capital of Culture, and you eventually find your way to the enclave of Mouttalos. Thousands of Turkish-Cypriots once lived here, before intercommunal fighting, reprisal killings and Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 drove their exodus to the island’s north. George Pachis, a local Greek-Cypriot, sometimes helps those who fled find the graves of relatives. Recalling one brings him close to tears. Accompanying an old widow through the cemetery recently, rather than the single tomb he expected, he found a gravestone listing nine names, including a two-year-old girl. All had been shot dead by Greek- Cypriot irregulars.
The scars of Paphos bear witness to the traumas of Europe’s last divided country. Cyprus’s cleavage may be peaceful today, but it is deeply entrenched. Its artefacts— barbed wire, rusting military outposts—are scrawled artlessly across the UN “buffer zone” that divides Nicosia, the capital. Checkpoints allow easy travel between north and south, but the two peoples lead separate lives; 48% of Greek-Cypriot students have never visited the north, and 43% “rarely” go. Cyprus’s rifts keep the island poorer, hinder the return of refugees, embarrass the European Union (Cyprus joined as a divided island in 2004, but only the Greek-Cypriot republic enjoys international recognition) and act as a regional spoiler, hampering EU- NATO co-operation and the EU’s relationship with Turkey.
The island has been formally split since Turkish troops occupied its northern third in 1974. Reunification schemes have come and gone, most recently in 2004, when the Greek-Cypriot majority rejected a plan devised by Kofi Annan, then UN secretary- general. But more recently Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, respective presidents of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, have brought a settlement within grasp. The two men, who enjoy a strong personal rapport, seek agreement on a “bizonal, bicommunal federation”, with a weak central government overseeing two autonomous communities. Hopes are high, despite the failure of a recent summit in Switzerland. If a deal is reached in the weeks ahead, a new constitution will be drawn up while the leaders drum up support for the double referendum that will follow. But that will take time, and not much is left: Mr Anastasiades faces elections in February 2018 that he may not win.
The outline of a deal has long been clear, and left alone the two men might have found agreement by now. But Cyprus has long been a pawn in the chess games of others. Today, unhappily, the island’s fate lies largely in the hands of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s authoritarian president. Under the provisions of Cyprus’s 1960 independence settlement, Turkey, along with Greece and Britain, maintains a right to military intervention if the island’s constitutional order is threatened. The Greek-Cypriots (and Greece itself) insist on scrapping those guarantees, and on the eventual removal of Turkish troops, several thousand of whom remain in the north. But despite fresh ideas from the UN to allay Turkish-Cypriot fears, such as a multinational police force stationed on the island, Mr Erdogan has so far refused to budge.
The security guarantees are at the heart of the Cyprus problem. Fix them, and you might unlock solutions to other outstanding issues, notably on territory and power-sharing. Only 1% of the island’s land mass remains disputed, and a compromise looks possible: the Turkish-Cypriots relinquish their claim to Morphou, a contested town in the north, in exchange for a rotating presidency, ensuring that Turkish-Cypriots run the federal state for part of the time.
But crossing red lines is hard when you feel the other lot’s guns trained on you. “In Cyprus we don’t fight facts, but ghosts,” says Harry Tzimitras, director of the PRIO Cyprus Centre in Nicosia, a research outfit. Memories of the violence of the 1960s make Turkish-Cypriots loth to give up their protector. Greek-Cypriots balk at the idea of mortgaging their security to Turkey. “It is like asking Latvia to accept a Russian security guarantee,” says Mr Anastasiades. Mr Erdogan’s frequent outrages at home are well noted by the many enemies of a settlement on the Greek-Cypriot side.
Will Mr Erdogan move? No one can be sure. His priority is winning a referendum on constitutional reforms, probably in April; some say he can compromise only after that. Others divine a willingness to help sooner, perhaps to get a piece of the hydrocarbon riches beneath Cypriot waters (and to wean the north off the subsidies it gets from the Turkish treasury). Two planned visits to Ankara by European leaders—Theresa May, Britain’s prime minister, on January 28th, and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, five days later—will sound the president out.
Nervous in Nicosia
Even a deal will leave diffcult referendums to be won. Neither leader will sign an agreement he cannot sell at home. But that job gets harder every year. Younger Greek-Cypriots, raised on a diet of Hellenic nationalism at school and with memories of nothing other than division, are the least likely to support reunification. Nor can support from the Turkish-Cypriots, who backed the Annan plan, be assumed, in part because Mr Akinci’s government is split. Tahsin Ertugruloglu, the Turkish-Cypriot foreign minister, describes the negotiations as a “total failure”.
If that seems unfair, caution is certainly in order. The Cyprus dispute is a repository of dashed hopes and broken dreams. Veteran island-watchers remain almost uniformly sceptical. (The expiry of the Obama administration, which quietly nudged both sides towards a deal, will not help.) It is noble to hope for a resolution to this wretched problem, and the courage of Messrs Anastasiades and Akinci has brought a deal tantalisingly close. But to bet on a reunified Cyprus implies a faith in Mr Erdogan’s statesmanship that the Turkish president has done little to warrant.
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
I still think that reunification will come from the public, rather than politics. That's why it is so refreshing to see the artistic communities striving for peace.
Web Designer / Developer. Currently working on Paphos Life.
Living in Polemi, Cyprus with my wife and daughter.
Living in Polemi, Cyprus with my wife and daughter.
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
I can see a settlement on the horizon, probably on paper this year and subject to the referendum. Once they get to that stage the public on both sides are likely to vote yes. The fly in the ointment is the attitude of the minority parties, who don't want a settlement. This is mainly due to their vested interest in permanent partition. They realise they will be even smaller than they are now proportionally, and their leaders would be unlikely to get to be president (with the income that is attached). They disguise their pro-partition stance by pretending to support a settlement but with totally unrealistic demands (e.g. every refugee to return to their homes, even if they never lived there. Greek Cypriots of course, no mention of Turkish Cypriot refugees).
These parties in question (in the south of the island) are EDEK, DIKO, Solidarity, Citizens Alliance, and the Greens. The fascist party ELAM have even more extreme demands, as you would expect, backed up by violence. Luckily these parties are so small that, even together, they can't overturn the combined weight of the two main parties (DISY and AKEL) who are in favour of a settlement.
These parties in question (in the south of the island) are EDEK, DIKO, Solidarity, Citizens Alliance, and the Greens. The fascist party ELAM have even more extreme demands, as you would expect, backed up by violence. Luckily these parties are so small that, even together, they can't overturn the combined weight of the two main parties (DISY and AKEL) who are in favour of a settlement.
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
Thanks Geoff. I don't think you have quite got the hang of this debate idea yet, have you.
I know through our postings in another place that you firmly believe there won't be a settlement. I suspect your views are in line with what suits your circumstances, having properties on both sides (if I understand correctly). So possibly a selfish view?
I have no personal axe to grind either way, but I firmly believe a settlement will be good for Cyprus and the Cypriot people.
I know through our postings in another place that you firmly believe there won't be a settlement. I suspect your views are in line with what suits your circumstances, having properties on both sides (if I understand correctly). So possibly a selfish view?
I have no personal axe to grind either way, but I firmly believe a settlement will be good for Cyprus and the Cypriot people.
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Rita Sherry
- Posts: 472
- Joined: Wed Dec 28, 2016 10:35 am
- Location: Tala
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
Josef K
I concur with your views and hopefully a settlement can and should be reached. Are you always so anti on most things Geoff? shame because good things do eventually pan out satisfactorily when otherwise good people see sense.
Rita
I concur with your views and hopefully a settlement can and should be reached. Are you always so anti on most things Geoff? shame because good things do eventually pan out satisfactorily when otherwise good people see sense.
Rita
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geoffreys
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
I firmly hoped there would be a settlement, but I firmly believe there won't be.Rita Sherry wrote: ↑Thu Apr 13, 2017 5:13 pm Josef K
I concur with your views and hopefully a settlement can and should be reached. Are you always so anti on most things Geoff? shame because good things do eventually pan out satisfactorily when otherwise good people see sense.
Rita
Geoff.
P.S. I am anti of those things I dislike, pro on those I do like.
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
I´m not so sure about that. At least if it turns out like reunification in Germany I can only say be careful what you wish for. E. g. the level of pensions dropped drastically (from 65% of average last salary to 48%) since people living in the East who never paid into the common pension pot suddenly were entitled to pensions. Same with unemployment benefits. They were cut drastically following reunification (e. g. now you can be forced to accept a much lower paying job and formerly lifelong benefits became time-limited). A solidarity surcharge to your income tax of initially 10% (now reduced to 5.5%) was introduced into the tax system to help fund building infrastructure in the formerly communist East. Infrastructure projects in the West got stopped to rechannel the funds towards the East (e. g. the ringroad around town I used to live never got completed, now ending in a meadow). Where streets used to be repaired prior to reunification you´ll nowadays simply find a warning sign lowering the speed limit due to poor road condition. Just to name a few results.
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
Jebba,
Whilst I freely admit you will know far more about German reunification that I, I think there is a difference between that which happened in Germany and what would happen in Cyprus. German reunification was driven by the people, not government. This resulted in a sudden reunification without prior planning, and I think this is what led to the matters you list. In Cyprus, the EU has been working with others to raise the standard of living and economy in the north so that there will be greater equality at the point of reunification. Additionally, the proposed federal system will be a lot looser than in Germany, as I understand it. There will obviously be some issues, there always are, but I don't think we will see a repeat of the German experience.
Whilst I freely admit you will know far more about German reunification that I, I think there is a difference between that which happened in Germany and what would happen in Cyprus. German reunification was driven by the people, not government. This resulted in a sudden reunification without prior planning, and I think this is what led to the matters you list. In Cyprus, the EU has been working with others to raise the standard of living and economy in the north so that there will be greater equality at the point of reunification. Additionally, the proposed federal system will be a lot looser than in Germany, as I understand it. There will obviously be some issues, there always are, but I don't think we will see a repeat of the German experience.
Re: Waiting for Erdogan: Cyprus
I don´t know much about how Greek Cypriots feel about the North but those two I asked for their views on reunification seemed interested only in getting their parent´s properties back. There was not much enthusiasm otherwise. And indeed the cultural difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is even bigger than that between Eastern and Western Germans. So you may be right in saying that reunification won´t be driven by the people (provided that this anecdotal evidence I gave can be generalised, which I don´t know). This however might become a problem in itself because it may restrict government´s ability to throw money at problems which will arise as this will not be popular in the South. At least in the beginning Western Germans were willing to pay to help those in the East. There was kind of euphoria which allowed government to raise taxes while cutting benefits and get away with it on election day. So my guess is there will be quite a lot of unhappiness on both sides. One side will feel treated unfairly and not being helped enough and the other will feel their tax money is wasted on ungrateful people they don´t feel close to anyway. Also Brexit will not make it easier to get EU funding. There will be less nicely plastered pedestrian crossings in villages with 10 inhabitants funded in the South than have been in the past which won´t do much to improve the mood.josef k wrote: ↑Fri Apr 14, 2017 3:13 pm Jebba,
Whilst I freely admit you will know far more about German reunification that I, I think there is a difference between that which happened in Germany and what would happen in Cyprus. German reunification was driven by the people, not government. This resulted in a sudden reunification without prior planning, and I think this is what led to the matters you list. In Cyprus, the EU has been working with others to raise the standard of living and economy in the north so that there will be greater equality at the point of reunification. Additionally, the proposed federal system will be a lot looser than in Germany, as I understand it. There will obviously be some issues, there always are, but I don't think we will see a repeat of the German experience.
